He neither took their suggestions seriously nor discussed them with Truman, who most likely would have shared his attitude anyway. "At no time from 1941 to 1945," declared Mr. Stimson, "did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by another responsible member of the Government, that atomic energy should not be used in that war." The next day, Truman writes, James F. Byrnes came to see him and told him a few details - that they were perfecting an explosive great enough to destroy the whole world. The decision was the President's and he faced it squarely. Else why this necessity for speed? But as Germany approached defeat and as the effort to produce an atomic bomb offered increasing promise of success, those few men who knew what was being done and who appreciated the enormous implications of atomic energy became more and more concerned. Truman regarded the Soviet Union as a valued ally in the just-concluded fight against Nazi Germany, but he distrusted it as a totalitarian state and was wary of its postwar plans. with James F. Byrnes THOMAS G. PATERSON The author is a member of the history department in the University of Connecticut. It was to provide for just this contingency, as well as to pin down those forces during the invasion of. To save content items to your account, The German surrender in May produced another crisis in the Japanese Government and led, after considerable discussion, to a decision to seek Soviet mediation. Within four months, it began, we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history. Trumans decision to use the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted from the interplay of his temperament and several other factors, including his perspective on the war objectives defined by his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the expectations of the American public, an assessment of the possibilities of achieving a quick victory by other means, and the complex American relationship with the Soviet Union. With FDR's death in April 1945, Byrnes became the man most associated with Yalta in the U.S. of State. Red paint was hurled, denting the airframe. Pressures and demands came at them relentlessly, and they developed policies concerning the atomic bomb in circumstances where they juggled numerous other serious issues. However, sharp dissent came from a group of scientists at the projects facilities at the University of Chicago. Thru OWM, Byrnes had authority over the large amount of civilian work that was related to the war effort. [11] As a matter of fact, one, bright brigadier general who innocently suggested that the Army might do well to look into the possibilities of atomic energy suddenly found himself the object of the most intensive investigation. We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. From Trumans perspective, the conference had two purposes: to lay the groundwork for rebuilding postwar Europe and to secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan. In addition to defeating Japan, he wanted to keep Russia from expanding their influence in Asia; he also wanted to restrain them in Europe. Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. She had ample reserves of weapons and ammunition and an army of 5,000,000 troops, 2,000,000 of them in the home islands. At the Potsdam conference in mid-July 1945, which brought together Truman, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill (replaced during the summit by Clement Attlee), an ultimatum was issued to Japan to surrender. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service. Though Truman did not act on the suggestion, he thought it "a sound idea" and told Grew to discuss it with his cabinet colleagues and the Joint Chiefs. Ambassador to Moscow Joseph Davies wrote in his diary on July 28, 1945: Davies continued in his diary that night. As he listened to them argue that the United States should refrain from using the bomb and that it should share its atomic secrets with the rest of the world after the war, Byrnes felt that he was dealing with unworldly intellectuals who had no grasp of political and diplomatic realities. Truman knew that, and so did other people involved." And Stimson himself later justified the use of the bomb on the ground that by 1 November conventional bombardment would have caused greater destruction than the bomb. Of particular concern to the committee was the question of how long it would take another country, particularly the Soviet Union, to produce an atomic bomb. During World War I, Truman commanded a battery of close-support 75mm artillery pieces in France and personally witnessed the human costs of intense front-line combat. All that can be said on the available evidence is that Japan was defeated in the military sense by August 1945 and that the bombing of Hiroshima, followed by the Soviet Union's declaration of war and the bombing of Nagasaki and the threat of still further bombing, acted as catalytic agents to produce the Japanese decision to surrender. They were his servants, and for the military officers especially Hirohitos continuance represented their best hope of retaining some poweror at least avoiding execution or prisonin the postwar period. Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, Robert Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War, Walter J. [12] So secret was the project, says John J. McCloy, that when he raised the subject at a White House meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1945 it "caused a sense of shock even among that select group." Find out more about saving content to Google Drive. Though her industries had been seriously crippled by air bombardment and naval blockade and her armed forces were critically deficient in many of the resources of war, Japan was still far from surrender. Then enter the name part From July 17 to July 25, . His personal diaries and letters reveal hope for a satisfactory postwar relationship but determination not to embark on a policy of unilateral concessions. The Japanese initiative to the Soviet Union also produced no results because Tokyo advanced no firm concessions. The President displayed a deep interest in the subject and both Stimson and McCloy emphasized the importance of the "large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt." "Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, and the President," he later wrote, "were evidently searching their hearts, and we had no need to press them. hasContentIssue false, Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan, Introduction: The Most Controversial Decision, Franklin Roosevelt, the Manhattan Project, and the Development of the Atomic Bomb, Harry Truman, Henry Stimson, and Atomic Briefings, James F. Byrnes, the Atomic Bomb, and the Pacific War, The Potsdam Conference, the Trinity Test, and Atomic Diplomacy, Byrnes, the Soviets, and the American Atomic Monopoly, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977336.005, Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. . However, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August fulfilling a promise of the Yalta conference in February changed their minds.. What finally forced the Japanese to surrender? General Giles. As Stimson expressed it, the atomic bomb was "the best possible sanction," the single weapon that would convince the Japanese "of our power to destroy the empire." "This may sound fantastic," they said, "but in nuclear weapons we have something entirely new in order of magnitude of destructive power, and if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage their possession gives us, we must use new and imaginative methods." By mid-1945, an American naval blockade had effectively cut off the home islands from the rest of the world. Vannevar Bush, Karl T. Compton, and James B. Conant. Certainly the failure to put a time limit on the declaration suggests that speed was not of the essence in American calculations. He believes it was the summer of 1943. The Japanese saw the emperor as embodying in a near-mystical way the divine spirit of the Japanese race. An invasion of Kyushu at an early date would, moreover, place United States forces in the most favorable position for the decisive assault against Honshu in 1946, and would "continue the offensive methods which have proved so successful in Pacific campaigns." The atomic bomb was a reality and when the news reached Potsdam it aroused great excitement among those who were let in on the secret. Leo Szilard (1898-1964) was a Hungarian-American physicist and inventor. So contrary to the recommendations of the top U.S. expert on Japan, Joseph Grew, and of Sec. But, Mr. Alperovitz argues, Truman and his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, were struck by the notion that ending World War II without dropping the atomic bomb would not have brought added . (David Robertson, Sly and Able, pg. [59], Nor did Stimson, in his memorandum, consider the effect of the Soviet Union's entry into the war. Most Americans wanted him removed; many assumed he would be hanged. "coreDisableEcommerce": false, Less than two weeks after being sworn in as president, Harry S. Truman received a long report from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. President's civilian advisers on the use of the bomb. Please refer to the appropriate style manual or other sources if you have any questions. He hinted to Stalin that the U.S. was about to use a new kind of . Revisionist historians would later argue that the bomb was used in the hope of securing Japans surrender before the Soviet Union could enter the Pacific War. With the 1944 presidential election approaching, FDR sought to replace Henry Wallace as Vice-President. To experience both sides, one might study the book Unforgettable Fire: Pictures Drawn by Atomic Bomb Survivors, which presents a number of . The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, than it would cost." It would be a fruitless task to weigh accurately the relative importance of all the factors leading to the Japanese surrender. To them, the "wave of horror and repulsion" that might follow the sudden use of an atomic bomb would more than outweigh its military advantages. [19] During the first meeting the scientific members reviewed for their colleagues the development of the Manhattan Project and described vividly the destructive power of the atomic bomb. [61], No final answer to this question is possible with the evidence at hand. But the first approach, made on June 3 to Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador, produced no results. In the absence of something approaching formal negotiations, American and Japanese diplomats could not even meet to discuss a compromise formula for postwar Japan. The emperor remained, under the jurisdiction of the Allied Supreme Commander over Japan, General Douglas MacArthur. On 5 August the forecasts were favorable and he gave the word to proceed with the mission the following day. Truman also says it was later When Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of, Scientific Research and Development came to the White House, that I was given a scientist's version of the atomic bomb. Szilrd petition - Wikipedia This course had already been considered and rejected as insufficient to produce surrender, though its advocates were by no means convinced that this decision was a wise one. Soviet participation was a goal long pursued by the Americans. We knew of course that the Japanese were ready to give up all conquests made in the war." tion did not answer all the questions or still the critics. Sec. That same day a previously prepared release from Washington announced to the world that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and warned the Japanese that if they did not surrender they could expect "a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which had never been seen on this earth." Tells also how "many months before, as part of the work of the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, of which he was chairman he sent investigators into Tennessee and to the state of Washington to find out what certain enormous constructions were and what their purpose was. The Interim Committee was a secret high-level group created in May 1945 by United States Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson at the urging of leaders of the Manhattan Project and with the approval of President Harry S. Truman to advise on matters pertaining to nuclear energy.Composed of prominent political, scientific and industrial figures, the Interim Committee had broad terms of reference . Manila had fallen in February; Iwo Jima was in American hands; and the success of the Okinawa invasion was assured. "We didn't know whether they [the Japanese] could be caused to surrender by other means or whether the invasion [of Japan] was really inevitable. We thought the two overriding considerations were the saving of lives in the war and the effect of our actions on the stability of the post-war world." For the critics, even that was not enough. [55]. HST says it left him puzzled, that "it was the first bit of information that had come to me about the atomic bomb but he gave me no details." The desirability of Soviet assistance had been confirmed also and plans for Russian entry into the war during August could now be made. But one cannot ignore the fact that some responsible officials feared the political consequences of Soviet intervention and hoped that ultimately it would prove unnecessary. On 7 August, Ambassador Sato in Moscow received word at last that Molotov would see him the next afternoon. (EAA talk, Aug. 6, 1951). WWII Atomic Bomb Lesson Plan - Stanford History Education Group - Yumpu Clearly in line with Trumans inclinations, the recommendations of the Interim Committee amounted to a prepackaged decision. In the opinion of the intelligence experts, neither blockade nor bombing alone would produce unconditional surrender before the date set for invasion. The instrument for such action lay at hand in the atomic bomb; events now seemed to justify its use. When Truman became president, a long and bitter military campaign in the Pacific, marked by fanatical Japanese resistance and strongly held racial and cultural hostilities on both sides, was nearing its conclusion. In the United States, conversely, the sure prospect of total victory made it close to impossible for Truman to abandon the goal of unconditional surrender. of War Henry Stimson, Assistant Sec. He was President Truman's closest foreign policy advisor during 1945. The sequence of events argues strongly that it was, for bombs were dropped on the 6th and 9th, and on the 10th Japan surrendered. With the defeat of Germany in May, the main element which had held the U.S., Britain, and Russia together was gone. Harry S. Truman and James F. Byrnes had little time to catch their breath as World War II ended. At 0245 on 6 August, the bomb-carrying plane was airborne. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt and Stalin had agreed on the terms of Soviet participation in the Far Eastern war. One of the disagreements was over reparations - how much Germany would pay the Allies for war damage. In this sense it may be argued that the bomb proved a success, for the war ended with the United States in full control of Japan. In these circumstances, Stimson believed the Japanese people would be susceptible to reason if properly approached. [53] In the view of the War Department these aims justified "any concessions which might be attractive to the Japanese, so long as our realistic aims for peace in the Pacific are not adversely affected." Atomic Bomb supporters argue that, although this destruction is distasteful by post-war . Thus, the Japanese Government had by then accepted. Secretary of War Stimson. ATOMIC BOMB By Louis Morton IT is now more than ten years since the atomic bomb exploded over Hiro shima and revealed to the world in one blinding flash of light the start . At that time He discussed a memorandum FDR had sent him from an unnamed "distinguished public servant who was fearful lest the Manhattan (atomic) project "be a lemon"; it was an opinion common among those not fully informed.." The writer, alarmed at rumors of extravagance in the project, suggested they get a body of outside scientists to pass on the peject [project] "because rumors are going around that Vannevar Bush and Jim Conant have sold the President a lemon on the subject and ought to be checked up." [81]. To them it had always seemed, in King's words, "that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops. " The successful explosion of the first bomb on 17 July did not apparently outweigh the reasons advanced earlier for keeping the bomb a secret; and evidently none of the men involved thought the question needed to be reviewed. Meeting with Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, in early May, he declared: I am here to make decisions, and whether they prove right or wrong I am going to make them, an attitude that implied neither impulsiveness nor solitude. [28] Furthermore, only two bombs would be available by August, the number General Groves estimated would be needed to end the war; these two would have to obtain the desired effect quickly. On July 16, the day before the conference opened, Truman received word that the first atomic bomb had been successfully tested in the New Mexico desert. I feared the cost would be enormous in, both lives and treasure." Although not exactly an object of religious worship, he was venerated as an all-important symbol of national identity. Has data issue: false please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. [22], Among the scientists working on the Manhattan Project were many who did not agree. For Byrnes the decision to use the bomb on Japan had political implications beyond ending the war. hasContentIssue false, Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan, Introduction: The Most Controversial Decision, Franklin Roosevelt, the Manhattan Project, and the Development of the Atomic Bomb, Harry Truman, Henry Stimson, and Atomic Briefings, James F. Byrnes, the Atomic Bomb, and the Pacific War, The Potsdam Conference, the Trinity Test, and Atomic Diplomacy, Byrnes, the Soviets, and the American Atomic Monopoly, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977336.010, Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. And the invasion itself, they believed, would be costly and possibly prolonged. Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content. Was it, in fact, as Stimson said, "the best possible sanction" after Japan rejected the Potsdam Declaration? "This is the biggest fool thing we have ever done," he told Truman after Vannevar Bush had explained to the President how the bomb worked. How Truman decided to drop the atomic bombs | We Are The Mighty After Hiroshima: Sharing the Atom Bomb | Foreign Affairs At General Arnold's insistence, the responsibility for selecting the particular target and fixing the exact date and hour of the attack was assigned to the field commander, General Spaatz. [33]. His first-hand experience with warfare clearly influenced his thinking about whether to use the atomic bomb. The plaque reflects the views of US navy leadership at the time. The emperor of Japan and Japan's surrender / Joseph C. Grew "A thousand years of regret" / Lewis L. Strauss. For a variety of reasons, including uncertainty as to whether the bomb would work, it had been decided that the Japanese should not be warned of the existence of the new weapon. Air and submarine attacks had all but cut off Japan from the resources of the Indies, and B-29's from the Marianas were pulverizing Japan's cities and factories. Stimson did not tell him what the project was but did tell him it concerned the topmost secret in the government and that they wanted to go ahead without disclosing any information. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other buildings.